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ALD-131    NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-4152 
 ___________ 
 
 PATRICIA WAITERS, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 DIRECTOR OSCAR AVILES; HUDSON 
COUNTY CORRECTIONAL CENTER 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-00421) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 3, 2011 
 
 Before:    SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: March 22, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Patricia Waiters, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court‟s orders 
dismissing several of her claims and granting summary judgment in favor of the 
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defendant-appellees as to the remaining claim.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
dismiss the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 
I 
 Waiters was employed as a corrections officer at the Hudson County Correctional 
Center (“HCCC”) from August 2000 until July 2005.  Waiters‟ mother, Betty Moore, 
who is also an employee of HCCC, apparently filed a charge of discrimination with the 
EEOC in late 2003 or early 2004.  Thereafter, Waiters was disciplined on a number of 
occasions, including three incidents in 2004.  In October 2004, Waiters received a notice 
of disciplinary action for an incident in which she played -- within the view of inmates -- 
a DVD depicting HCCC corrections officers during training and at their academy 
graduation.  Some of the scenes included material that allegedly embarrassed some of 
Waiters‟ colleagues.  In January 2005, Waiters received a disciplinary notice for an 
incident in which she displayed improper behavior towards two fellow officers who 
intended to testify against her at an administrative hearing related to the DVD incident.
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She also received a disciplinary notice for failing to properly maintain her log book. 
 In February 2005, Waiters filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging that the 
disciplinary actions against her amounted to race discrimination and retaliation for her 
mother‟s complaint to the EEOC.  On June 30, 2005, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue 
letter. 
                                                 
 
1
  The notice was amended in April 2005 to include a second similar incident 
involving one of the fellow officers. 
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 In July 2005, following a disciplinary hearing, Hearing Officer Howard Moore 
found Waiters guilty on charges of conduct unbecoming a public employee, 
insubordination, neglect of duty, and other sufficient cause.  Moore recommended a 65-
day suspension and termination.  Waiters appealed, and ALJ Jones upheld Waiters‟ 
termination and suspension, although Judge Jones reduced the term of suspension to 30 
days.  The Merit System Board approved Judge Jones‟ recommendation in April 2008.  
Waiters‟ appeal to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, was dismissed as untimely. 
 Meanwhile, in September 2005, Waiters filed another complaint with the EEOC, 
alleging that she was retaliated against for her first EEOC complaint.  She alleged that 
HCCC Director Oscar Aviles convinced Waiters‟ coworkers to falsify disciplinary 
reports against her; that Aviles harassed her; that her termination was retaliatory; and 
that, on one occasion after her termination, she and her mother were harassed when she 
picked her mother up from work at the HCCC.  The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on 
December 11, 2006.   
 In January 2007, Waiters filed in the District Court a pro se complaint, followed 
by a counseled amended complaint.  Waiters‟ amended complaint alleged retaliation, 
racial discrimination, discrimination based on ancestry, and a hostile work environment, 
all in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”).2  Waiters also sought relief at common law for the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
2
  Although the complaint asserted jurisdiction under the ADEA, Waiters did not 
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defendants‟ allegedly retaliatory conduct.  The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, 
which the District Court granted as to all claims except for the Title VII retaliation claim.  
The parties proceeded to discovery, after which the District Court granted the defendants‟ 
motion for summary judgment on the retaliation claim.  Waiters filed a timely appeal. 
II 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because Waiters is 
proceeding in forma pauperis, we must dismiss the appeal if it “lacks an arguable basis 
either in law or in fact.”  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also 
§ 1915(e)(2).  We exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s orders dismissing 
Waiters‟ claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and granting summary 
judgment.  See Spence v. ESAB Group, Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010); 
Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009).  As to the order 
dismissing Waiters‟ claims, “[t]he District Court‟s judgment is proper only if, accepting 
all factual allegations as true and construing the complaint in the light most favorable to 
[Waiters], we determine that [she] is not entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of 
the complaint.”  McGovern v. City of Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009).  As 
to the order granting summary judgment, “we can affirm only „if the pleadings, the 
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no 
                                                                                                                                                             
allege in any count of the complaint that the defendants‟ conduct violated her rights under 
that statute.  The District Court dismissed Waiters‟ claims to the extent that they arose 
under the ADEA, and nothing in Waiters‟ filings in the District Court or on appeal 
suggest that she challenges that decision. 
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genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.'”  Spence, 623 F.3d at 216 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)).  “A genuine 
issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party 
for a jury to return a verdict for that party.”  Id.  “In evaluating the evidence, we must 
view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences 
in that party's favor.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 The District Court first noted that, to the extent that Waiters sought to raise claims 
asserted in her first EEOC complaint -- i.e., race discrimination and retaliation in the 
form of disciplinary notices -- her federal complaint was time-barred.  We agree.  A 
plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the allegedly unlawful 
employment practice, and then must file a complaint in district court within 90 days of 
receiving a right-to-sue letter.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), (f).  When a plaintiff 
complains of discrete acts, such as termination, wrongful suspension, wrongful discipline, 
or wrongful accusation, Title VII‟s 90-day limitations period applies to each wrongful 
action; failure to raise such claims within the limitations period will result in dismissal of 
the lawsuit.  See O‟Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2006).  
Waiters‟ first EEOC complaint was timely filed in February 2005, and she was informed 
of her right to sue in June 2005.  Because she complained of discrete acts -- specifically, 
unwarranted disciplinary action -- the 90-day limitations period applied, and her January 
2007 District Court complaint was untimely as to that conduct. 
 The District Court next considered Counts II and III of Waiters‟ complaint, which 
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alleged that she suffered discrimination on the basis of race and ancestry.  To withstand a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to „state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟”  Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  The District Court correctly reasoned that dismissal of Counts II 
and III was appropriate because Waiters failed to allege any facts correlating the adverse 
actions against her with any discriminatory motive, as required under Title VII.  Waiters‟ 
amended complaint included only conclusory allegations, which is insufficient to sustain 
a cause of action.  See id.  For the same reason, we agree with the District Court that 
Count IV of Waiters‟ complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.  Waiters alleged a hostile work environment, but failed to allege any facts or 
circumstances -- beyond her bare assertions -- that the defendants‟ conduct was motivated 
by discriminatory animus. 
 Count V of Waiters‟ complaint sought relief under common law principles 
prohibiting retaliation.  The District Court dismissed the claim, reasoning that New 
Jersey‟s Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 10:5-1, et seq., 
which protects against retaliatory discrimination, preempts or precludes supplementary 
common law actions.  Although Waiters‟ counseled complaint merely cited “common 
law” as a source of relief, her response to the defendants‟ motion to dismiss indicates that 
she may have intended to pursue a retaliation claim under the NJLAD.  Even if we were 
to conclude that the District Court improperly dismissed Count V on that narrow reading 
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of the pleadings, any error was harmless.  Claims raised under the NJLAD are analyzed 
under the same framework applicable to Title VII cases.  See Gerety v. Atl. City Hilton 
Casino Resort, 877 A.2d 1233, 1237-38 (N.J. 2005).  As discussed below, because the 
District Court properly disposed of Waiters‟ Title VII retaliation claim at the summary 
judgment stage, a NJLAD retaliation claim stemming from the same conduct would also 
have been unsuccessful. 
 Finally, we turn to the District Court‟s resolution of Count I, which alleged that 
the defendants retaliated against Waiters, in violation of Title VII, for filing her first 
EEOC complaint.  To prevail on a retaliation claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must show 
that:  “(1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took an 
adverse employment action against her; and (3) there was a causal connection between 
her participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”  Nelson v. 
Upsala Coll., 51 F.3d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1995).  Waiters alleged that the defendants 
retaliated against her by:  pursuing unwarranted disciplinary hearings against her, 
terminating her, and harassing her when she picked her mother up at the HCCC.  With 
regard to Waiters‟ claims concerning her disciplinary hearings, the District Court 
reasoned that the evidence on record demonstrated that all but one of the disciplinary 
proceedings against her were initiated late in 2004, at least two months before Waiters 
filed her first complaint with the EEOC.  Thus, in the District Court‟s view, the 
disciplinary hearings could not have been initiated as a result of her protected activity, 
making summary judgment appropriate.  We agree. 
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 The District Court also reasoned that summary judgment was appropriate with 
regard to Waiters‟ claim that her termination was retaliatory.  Again, we agree.  The 
thorough opinions of the hearing officer and Judge Jones explain in exhaustive detail the 
factual bases supporting the charges against Waiters and, ultimately, their reasons for 
recommending termination.  Waiters offered no evidence indicating that the decision to 
terminate her was in any way based on a retaliatory motive. 
 On appeal, Waiters contends that some or all of the evidence presented against her 
was fabricated after she complained to the EEOC, and back-dated to appear unrelated to 
her protected conduct.  However, beyond her bare assertions, there is no evidence in the 
record that the conduct of which she complained was supported by false evidence or 
motivated by any desire to retaliate against her. 
 Finally, we agree with the District Court that summary judgment was appropriate 
concerning Waiters‟ claim that she was harassed when picking up her mother.  Aside 
from the averment in her complaint, Waiters provided no evidence to support her claim. 
 Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal. 
